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In the SupreJDe Court 
of the State of Utah 
D. \V. NICHOL, ) 
Ptaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
HENNING WALL, Case No. 7881 
Defendant and Appellant. 
VIRGINIA WALL, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal by defendant Henning Wall from 
a judgment made and entered by the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Clarence E. Baker, Judge, following 
trial of the cause by the Court without a jury, and from 
the denial by the Court of appellant's Motion for a 
New Trial. The judgment recovered was a money 
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judgment in the amount of $847.51, which amount was 
found to be due and owing by appellant to respondent 
for labor and materials furnished, after allowance had 
been made by the Court of certain offsets contained 
in appellant's counterclaim (R. 2). 
Respondent, a building contractor, and appellant 
had been acquainted for many years. They were "old 
friends" (R. 25). After appellant's house had been 
largely constructed and required only finishing work 
the parties entered into an oral agreement whereby 
respondent was to furnish certain labor and materials 
for the house, and was to receive in return therefor 
certain materials and the use of certain equipment 
owned by appellant (R. 8). Respondent testified that 
each party would pay the other the "reasonable charge" 
for the use of the other's equipment, that they were 
''passing equipment back and forth'' and that the 
charge of one would offset the other (R. 24, 25). 
Materials and labor were furnished as detailed by 
respondent (R. 8 et seq.), and he received materials 
and use of equipment in exchange. He did not receive 
enough to offset his charges, and appellant refused to 
pay the difference, apparently because appellant and 
his wife believed the respondent's charges were unrea-
sonable (R. 35, et seq.). 
When respondent instituted this action appellant 
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and his wife were named defendants, but at the conclusion 
of plaintiff's evidence the Court granted the motion of 
defendant, Virginia \Vall, for a Judgment of Dismissal 
since no case had been proved against her, and the action 
proceeded against appellant alone (R. 32). 
The respondent's complaint was disputed ·by appel-
lant only to the extent that he did not belive that respond-
ent was reasonably entitled to as much as was claimed. 
Since the Trial Court found against appellant on this 
phase of the matter, and since there is evidence to sup-
port the Trial Court's finding, no question is being 
raised on this appeal concerning the reasonableness of 
respondent's claims. 
Respondent, in turn, did not dispute the items 
claimed by appellant in his counterclaim except that 
the sum of $680.00, claimed by appellant for the rental 
of a Disston chain saw, was resisted and disputed by 
respondent, who testified that he did not "agree" with 
that sum but that he would be willing to pay a "fair 
rental on it" (R. 24). The Trial Court found the rental 
value to be the sum of $100.00, or $580.00 less than 
asked by appellant. Therefore, this appeal concerns 
itself solely with the question of the reasonable rental 
value of the chain saw. 
No evidence was produced by either party from dis-
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interested sources as to the reasonable rental value of 
such equipment at the time such equipment was rented, 
which was in September and October, 1948. Respondent 
produced no evidence on the subject whatever, but 
appellant, after being properly qualified (R. 48) stated 
that because such saws were so difficult to obtain and 
because the hazards entailed in their use in the forests 
were so great, the reasonable rate of rental of such 
saws in the area in question at the time in question was 
$20.00 per day (R. 48). It was established without doubt 
that respondent had been in possession of appellant's 
chain saw for a period from September 20, 1948, to 
October 29, 1948, a period of 39 days, and while the 
saw was not being used throughout that time appellant 
finally was required to retrieve the saw from respond-
ent (R. 50). Appellant allowed five days off the total 
period and billed respondent for 34 days rental at $20.00 
per day (Exhibit A). 
At the conclusion of the evidence Counsel for 
respondent made a "tender of proof" (R. 60) con-
cerning an 0. P. A. regulation and claimed that such 
regulation would show "twelve per cent per month of 
the purchase price'' as the maximum rental allowed 
under 0. P. A. regulations. This "tender of proof" was 
made despite the fact that Counsel had no such proof 
available, in that there was no 0. P. A. regulation in 
his possession or in court, and no witness available to 
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testify concerning the regulation even if the Trial Court 
had felt that ~uch proof was proper. The tender was 
made after son1e colloquy between the Court and Counsel 
in which it was n1ade to appear that the regulations 
referred to by Counsel had no application to any parti-
cular area, were out of date, and were not shown to be 
related to the type or kind of saw in question, or to the 
use to which this saw was put (R. 59, 60). 
Following argument the Court ruled orally that 
respondent would be entitled to judgment of $1136.39, 
less the admitted offsets claimed by appellant, together 
with the sum of $100.00 rental for the chain saw. Counsel 
inquired of the Court as to the basis for the finding of 
$100.00 chain saw rental, to which the Court responded 
that he regarded that figure as ''a fair and reasonable 
rent" for the saw and "**~'that is twelve per cent of 
the purchase price or thereabouts anyhow.'' Counsel 
for appellant then inquired if the Court in referring to 
the twelve per cent figure was using evidence which had 
been rejected, to which the Court replied: ''I am not 
saying. ***" (R. 60A). 
Following the preparation of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and entry of Judgment appellant 
moved the Court for a new trial, urging that the findings 
and judgment were against the weight of the evidence, 
and specifically urging that the Court, in concluding that 
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$100.00 was a reasonable value for rental of the chain 
saw, made such a finding without any support in the 
evidence, and on the basis of rejected evidence, and in 
total disregard of the only evidence admitted in the case, 
which was to the effect that a reasonable rental was the 
sum of $680.00. The Motion for New Trial was denied 
and this appeal resulted (R. 68). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE REASONABLE 
VALUE OF THE RENTAL OF THE CHAIN SAW, SINCE ITS 
FINDING IS WITHOUT SUPPORT IN THE EVIDENCE AND 
DISREGARDS UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE, AND A 
JUDGMENT BASED ON SUCH A FINDING SHOULD NOT 
BE SUSTAINED. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE REASONABLE 
VALUE OF THE RENTAL OF THE CHAIN SAW, SINCE 
ITS FINDING IS "WITHOUT SUPPORT IN THE EVIDENCE 
AND DISREGARDS UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE, AND 
A JUDGMENT BASED ON SUCH FINDING SHOULD NOT 
BE SUSTAINED. 
A thorough examination of the record in this case 
reveals that there was no evidence before the Court to 
sustain a finding of $100.00 as being reasonable value 
of the rental of the chain saw. The only evidence on the 
subject which was admitted in the case was evidence by 
the appellant, who testified that he had been in the 
business of cutting timber for approximately seven years 
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and had had occasion to try to rent chain saws, and was 
aware of the prevailing practices in the equipment 
industry at the period. in question. ,He stated that because 
of the extraordinary hazards to such rnachinery when 
it is used in the rnountains and forests to cut timber the 
owners of chain saws have felt it necessary to receive 
a high rental. If a tree being cut by the saw should bind, 
or if it should fall at an unexpected time or in an unex-
pected direction, the saw could be severely damaged 
and, in fact, could be crushed and destroyed. Such 
factors obviously cause rentals to increase and, in view 
of these factors, the evidence of appellant that a proper 
rental charge for the saw was $20.00 a day is readily 
understandable. 
Respondent did not bring any evidence to the trial 
of this case on this subject. He was, of course, aware 
that appellant had claimed the sum of $20.00 per day, 
since he had received a bill from appellant long before 
trial (Exhibit A). If such rental is, in fact, not proper 
and not in accord with the custom in the industry, it 
seems to appellant that the burden of establishing those 
facts and of overcoming appellant's proof was upon re-
spondent after the appellant had produced his testimony. 
The only attempt by respondent to satisfy this burden 
consisted of the so-called ''tender of proof'' made by 
Counsel for respondent after all the evidence had been 
received. There can be no valid reason for this ''tender'' 
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except that it was designed to influence the Trial Court, 
because Counsel knew that he had no evidence to back 
up his "tender" if the Court had overruled appellant's 
objection to the proferred proof. It seems clear that 
Counsel was successful in this connection because the 
Trial Court, when asked for a basis for his ruling, 
resorted to the formula suggested by Counsel, which 
formula had been rejected as evidence by the Court a 
matter of moments before. 
It is our position that a finding based upon rejected 
evidence, and which totally disregards uncontroverted 
evidence in the case, is finding which cannot support a 
judgment and a judgment based on such finding should 
be reversed. 
We believe the general rule Is as stated in 3 
American Jurisprudence 464: 
''Findings not supported by any competent evi-
dence, or which disregard uncontroverted, credi-
ble evidence, cannot be sustained on appeal and a 
judgment based thereon will be reversed.'' 
Research indicates that this rule has been applied 
by the Supreme Court of Utah on many occasions, but it 
is customarily stated conversely, as the Court said in 
the recent case of Buckley vs. Cox, 247 Pacific (2d) 277, 
(1952): 
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''If there is cmnpetent evidence in the record 
to support the court'~ findings, the judgment 
should not be disturbed.'' 
However, in the case of Hathaway vs. United Tintic 
Mines Company, 42 Utah 520, 132 Pacific 388, decided in 
1913, the headnote states the rule to be : 
''The Trial Court should not make a finding of 
fact where there is no evidence to support it, and 
its judgment thereon will be reversed.'' 
In that case the action was brought to foreclose a 
mechanic's lien against certain mining property. There 
was no evidence in the record from which the Court 
could legally determine that the respondent had complied 
with the terms of the mechanic's lien statute. N otwith-
standing this lack of evidence, the Trial Court found 
that the statute had, in fact, been followed, and that the 
respondent was entitled to a lien. In addition, without 
any evidence whatever, the Court found that the respond-
ent was entitled to costs for preparing and filing a lien 
and $25.00 attorneys' fees for foreclosing the lien. 
This Court, in reversing the judgment, commented 
that the lower court might just as well have entered 
a judgment against any other citizen of the state as 
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against appellant, so far as the evidence justified such a 
judgment. The Court went on to say: 
"No court should permit itself to make a finding 
of fact where the record is conclusive ... that 
there is absolutely no evidence to support such 
findings.'' 
Research indicates that this case, and its companion 
case decided the same day and upon the same principles, 
have never been overruled and are still the law of this 
state. 
In a later case analogous in principle to the case 
at bar is Stringfellow vs. Botterill Automobile Company, 
63 Utah 56, 221 Pacific 861, (1923). In that case plaintiff 
brought suit to recover damages arising out of the sale 
to him by defendant Company of a 1921 automobile, 
in which sale defendant had represented that the car 
was a 1922 model. 
The Trial Court found the issues against plaintiff 
and in favor of defendant despite the fact that the evi-
dence on the question of the model of the car was con-
clusive against defendant. The Supreme Court stated 
the rule to be that a finding of the Trial Court that a 
buyer sustained no damage through the seller's breach 
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of contract is not binding on appeal, if opposed to ·all 
the evidence. 
The Court concluded by saying that the Trial Court's 
finding on the issue of damage "had no evidence what-
ever to support it and was against all the evidence.'' 
The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded 
for a new trial. 
In Miller vs. Manhattan Fire lt Marine Insurance Co., 
76 Utah 540, 290 Pacific 937, decided in 1930, the judg-
ment of the lower court was reversed because there was 
no support in the evidence for its findings. The Supreme 
Court, in disposing of the case, commented that since 
the action was one at law the Court was not authorized 
to make or direct findings or to render a judgment, 
but the Court said: 
"We, finding, as we do, that the findings of the 
Trial Court in the particulars indicated are not 
supported by the evidence and that the judgment 
is erroneous, are authorized only to reverse the 
judgment and to remand the case for a new 
trial.'' 
The principles of law discussed in the foregoing 
argument have never been seriously questioned so far 
as can be determined, and it is appellant's contention 
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that the facts of this case require the application of 
these principles. If this judgment is allowed to stand, 
it will be a recognition and approval of the act of a 
trial court in deciding a case and assessing damages 
without regard to the evidence and on the basis of facts 
and figures not lawfully and properly before the court 
or admitted as evidence in the case. 
CONCLUSION 
This judgment is excessive in the amount of $580.00 
because of the manifest error committed by the Trial 
Court. While this is not an imposing sum it neverthe-
less represents considerably more than one-half of the 
judgment now entered against appellant. The size of 
the judgment, however, should have no bearing on the 
question of the principle involved in this case and appel-
lant respectfully submits that a judgment which is based 
either upon no evidence, or a judgment which completely 
disregards the evidence admitted in the case, should 
not be sustained by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW 
JOHN H. SNOW 
Attor'Ytieys for Appellant 
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·. 
Received two copies of the within brief this 24th day of 
November, 1952. 
Critchlow, Watson & Warnock, 
by)l_d\v~ 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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